1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF16 SW China
~~AF16~~ AF16

669 Political Committee and commanding general of the Second Field Army.[3]

669 727 Another factor that contributed to the nature of the "bandit-suppression campaigns" in the Southwest was the large number of Nationalist troops that surrendered to the Communists in this region. The Communists claim they accepted the surrender of 900,000 Nationalist soldiers in Southwest China -- 400,000 of them in organized units and the remainder in scattered groups or as individuals. Part of the captured forces were reorganized and relocated as Communist units, but large numbers were discharged and ordered to their homes. Some of this latter group remained at large to create serious problems for the Communists, including reported participation in open rebellions during 1950 and 1951.

669 725 Communist military campaigns in the Southwest against the remnants of Nationalist

3. Report of Liu Po-ch'eng, Cheng-fu Kung-tso Pao-Kao Hui-Pien, 1950, [Compendium of Government Reports 1950], Peking, People's Press, 1951, pp. 989-91.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF16 SW China
~~AF16~~ AF16

669 725 forces and robber gangs were conducted in the same manner as in other regions. Elements of the regular Red Army encircled the opposing forces, while Party cadres organized and indoctrinated local militias. The combined Communist forces then cut the opposition into small groups and destroyed the main body of resistance. The mopping up of isolated elements was entrusted to the local militia, permitting large numbers of regular troops to be shifted to pacified rural areas for political work.

669 Within the general pattern of "bandit-suppression" strategy, different timing and tactics were employed in each province to meet the varying conditions encountered by the Communists. The work of eliminating armed resistance in Szechwan was undertaken within four special districts.[4] Counter-revolutionary activity organized by Kuomintang elements and aided by professional bandits, as the Communists described it, seems to have posed the greatest threat in the southern and eastern special districts of Szechwan. Simultaneous campaigns launched during the spring of 1950 in the four special

4. For reports of the work of the four special districts in Szechwan, see Compendium of Government Reports 1950, pp. 1025-70.